

	<b>Appellant</b>	<b>Queenstown Lakes District Council</b>
	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Hawthorn Estate Limited; Bailey, T and Others</b>
	Decision Number	CA45/05 (No 2)
	Court	William Young P, Robertson and Cooper JJ; Court of Appeal (NZ)
5	Judgment Date	12/06/2006
	Counsel/Appearances	Castiglione, JR; Marquet, NS; Soper, NH; Wylie QC, ED
	Cases Cited	Aley v North Shore CC 18/05/98, Salmon J, HC Auckland M251/98 (No 2), [1999] 1 NZLR 365, (1998) 4 ELRNZ 227, [1998] NZRMA 361, 3 NZED 384; Arrigato Investments Ltd v Auckland RC 11/09/01, CA84/01, [2002] 1 NZLR 323, (2001) 7 ELRNZ 193, [2001] NZRMA 481, 6 NZED 689; Bayley v Manukau CC 22/09/98, CA115/98, [1999] 1 NZLR 568, (1998) 4 ELRNZ 461, [1998] NZRMA 513, 3 NZED 772; Dye v Auckland RC 11/09/01, CA86/01, [2002] 1 NZLR 337, (2001) 7 ELRNZ 209, [2001] NZRMA 513, 6 NZED 698; Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough DC 03/07/97, CA255/96, [1997] 3 NZLR 257, (1997) 3 ELRNZ 249, [1997] NZRMA 385, 2 NZED 537; Geotherm Group Ltd v Waikato RC 01/07/03, Salmon J, HC Auckland CIV2003-404-27, AP26/03, [2004] NZRMA 1, 8 NZED 698; O'Connell Construction Ltd v Christchurch CC 15/03/02, Panckhurst J, HC Christchurch AP29/01, [2003] NZRMA 216, 7 NZED 350; Queenstown Lakes DC v Hawthorn Estate Ltd 20/05/05, CA45/05; Rodney DC v Gould 11/10/04, Cooper J, HC Auckland CIV-2003-485-2182, (2005) 11 ELRNZ 165, [2006] NZRMA 217; Smith Chilcott Ltd v Auckland CC 26/06/01, CA267/00, CA12/01, [2001] 3 NZLR 473, (2001) 7 ELRNZ 126, [2001] NZRMA 503, 6 NZED 514; Wilson v Selwyn DC 24/08/04, Fogarty J, HC Christchurch CIV-2004-485-720, (2005) 11 ELRNZ 79 [2005] NZRMA 76, 9 NZED 751
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35	Statutes	Resource Management Act 1991, s 2, s 5, s 5(2), s 5(2)(a), s 5(2)(b), s 5(2)(c), s 6, s 7, s 7(f), s 8, s 30(1), s 31, s 45, s 56, s 61, s 66, s 94, s 104, s 104(1)(a), s 104(1)(b), s 104(1)(c), s 104(1)(d), s 104(1)(e), s 104(1)(f), s 104(1)(g), s 104(1)(h), s 104(1)(i), s 105, s 105(1)(c), s 123(b), s 125, s 271A, s 308; Resource Management Amendment Act 2003; Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1)
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	Full text pages:	33 pages

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**Keywords**

Court of Appeal; subdivision; residential; effect adverse; resource consent; environment; sustainable management; district plan; zoning; rural; rural residential

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**5 Significant in Law, s 2 and s 104 RMA**

*The term “environment” in s 2 RMA embraces the future state of the environment as it might be modified by the utilisation of rights to carry out a permitted activity under a district plan.*

**SYNOPSIS**

10 This was an appeal by the council against the High Court’s decision in CIV-2004-485-1441, 45. The High Court had upheld the Environment Court’s ruling in Decision C083/04 to set aside the decision of the council declining the respondent’s resource consent application. The respondent had sought consent for the subdivision of 32 residential lots in Queenstown. The  
15 proposed subdivision was in an area subject to large amounts of development with multiple resource consents granted but not yet implemented.

The key issue for the Court was whether the council, when considering whether to grant consent, had been obliged to restrict its consideration of  
20 effects to effects on the environment in existence at time of the decision or whether the council should have considered the future state of the environment.

The Court noted that the council needed to give effect to the purpose of the RMA, which was the sustainable management of resources including  
25 management both now and in the future. The Court considered that future effects were inevitably linked with the future state of the environment both modified through permitted activity and by granted resource consents, which were likely to be implemented. The Court considered the word  
30 “environment” embraces the future state of the environment as it might be modified by the utilisation of rights to carry out a permitted activity under a district plan [12 ELRNZ 321 at 31]. The Court did not endorse the High Court’s approach that the council should have also taken into account the effects of resource consents likely to be granted in the future.

Following on from this conclusion the Court held that the Environment  
35 Court had not speculated when taking into account the approved building platforms in the “triangle” of land. The Environment Court had accepted evidence that it was practically certain that the approved building sites would be built on. Due to the rejection of the relevant environment being confined to the existing environment there was no error of law.

The Court rejected an argument that the Environment Court had not given proper consideration to the application of the permitted baseline. The Court considered that a permitted baseline analysis was not pertinent to the issue, and thus did not establish any error of law.

5 The appellant argued that the Environment Court had wrongly concluded the landscape category it was required to consider was Other Rural Landscape under the district plan. The Court held that the Environment Court had been correct to have regard to what the landscape would be like  
10 when resource consents already granted were utilised, before deciding which classification would apply. The Court held the High Court had been correct to approve the Environment Court's approach and no error of law occurred.

15 Lastly, the Court upheld the High Court's view that the Environment Court had not considered an irrelevant matter or committed an error of law in its references to rural-residential zones.

The appeal was dismissed. The respondent was awarded \$6000 costs.

## FULL TEXT OF CA45/05 (NO 2)

### JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

20 **A The appeal is dismissed.**

**B The appellant is to pay costs to the first respondent in the sum of \$6,000 together with usual disbursements. We certify for two counsel.**

### REASONS

25 (Given by Cooper J)

[1] This is an appeal from a judgment of Fogarty J pursuant to leave granted by this Court under s 308 of the Resource Management Act 1991 ("the Act").

30 [2] Fogarty J had dismissed an appeal by the council and the second respondents against a decision of the Environment Court. The Environment Court had set aside a decision of the Council declining a resource consent application made by the first respondent ("Hawthorn").

35 [3] As a result of the Environment Court decision, Hawthorn was authorised to proceed to subdivide and carry out subdivision works on a property near Queenstown. Some 32 residential lots were proposed to be created.

[4] This Court gave leave for the following questions to be pursued on appeal:

1. *Whether His Honour Justice Fogarty erred in law when he determined (either expressly or by implication):*
  - (a) *that the receiving environment should be understood as including not only the environment as it exists but also the reasonably foreseeable environment;*
  - (b) *that it was not speculation for the Environment Court to take into account approved building platforms in the triangle and on the outside of the roads that formed it;*
  - (c) *that the Environment Court had given adequate and appropriate consideration to the application of the permitted baseline.*
2. *Whether His Honour Justice Fogarty erred in law when he determined that the Environment Court had not erred in law in concluding that the landscape category it was required to consider was an “Other Rural Landscape”.*
3. *Whether His Honour Justice Fogarty erred in law when he held that the Environment Court had not erred in law when it considered the minimum subdivision standards in the Rural Residential zone in addressing the first respondent’s proposal which is in a Rural General zone.*

[5] As was observed by the Court in granting leave, the questions are interrelated, and the answers to the second and third questions are in large part dependent on the answer to the constituent parts of the first. The main issue that underlies the appeal is whether a consent authority considering whether or not to grant a resource consent under the Act must restrict its consideration of effects to effects on the environment as it exists at the time of the decision, or whether it is legitimate to consider the future state of the environment.

[6] It was common ground that the three questions fall to be considered under the Act in the form in which it stood prior to the coming into force of the Resource Management Amendment Act 2003.

### **Background**

[7] Hawthorn applied to the Council for both subdivision and land use activity consent in respect of land in the Wakatipu Basin. The land comprises 33.9 hectares, and is situated near the junction of Lower Shotover and Domain Roads, with frontage to both of those roads. It is part of a triangle of land bounded by them and Speargrass Flat Road, known locally as “the triangle”.

[8] Hawthorn's development would subdivide the land into 32 separate lots, containing between 0.63 and 1.30 hectares, together with access lots, and a central communal lot containing 12.36 hectares. The application also sought consent to the erection of a residential unit on each of the 32 residential sites, within nominated building platforms that were shown on plans submitted with the application. The proposal required consent as a non-complying activity under the operative district plan, and as a discretionary activity under the proposed district plan.

[9] There was an existing resource consent which allowed subdivision of the land into eight blocks of approximately four hectares in each case. Those approved allotments contained identified building platforms.

[10] The Environment Court recorded that the whole of the land proposed to be subdivided is flat, apart from a small rocky outcrop. The Court observed that "the triangle" had been the subject of considerable development pressure over the past decade, and that within the 166 hectare area so described, 24 houses had been erected, with a further 28 consented to, but not yet built. Outside of the roads that physically form the triangle were a further 35 approved building platforms. It is unclear from the Environment Court's decision whether any of those had been built on.

[11] In assessing the effects of the proposal on the environment for the purposes of s 104(1)(a) of the Act, a key question that arose was whether the consent authority ought to take into account the receiving environment as it might be in the future and, in particular, if existing resource consents that had been granted but not yet implemented, were implemented in the future. The council had declined consent to the application and on the appeal by Hawthorn to the Environment Court argued that that Court's consideration should be limited to the environment as it existed at the time that the appeal was considered. That proposition was rejected by the Environment Court, and also by Fogarty J.

[12] Before we confront the questions that have been asked directly, we briefly summarise the reasoning in the decisions respectively of the Environment Court and the High Court.

### **The Environment Court decision**

[13] The Environment Court held that the dwellings, and the approved building platforms yet to be developed by the erection of buildings, both within and outside the triangle, were part of the receiving environment. As to the undeveloped sites, that conclusion was founded on evidence that the Court accepted that it was "practically certain that approved building sites in the Wakatipu Basin will be built on." That conclusion, not able to be challenged on appeal, is critical to the arguments advanced in the High Court and in this Court.

[14] The Environment Court held that the eight dwellings for which resource consent had already been granted on the subject site were appropriately considered as part of the “permitted baseline”, a concept explained in the decisions of this Court in *Bayley v Manukau City Council* [1999] NZLR 568, *Smith Chilcott Limited v Auckland City Council* [2001] 3 NZLR 473 and *Arrigato Investments Limited v Auckland Regional Council* [2002] 1 NZLR 323. However, it rejected an argument by Hawthorn that landowners in the area could have a reasonable expectation that the Council would grant consent to subdivisions that matched the intensity of three other subdivisions in the triangle, for which the Council had recently granted consent. Those subdivisions had an average area of two hectares per allotment. Hawthorn had argued that the present development should be considered in the light of a future environment in which subdivision of that intensity would occur throughout the triangle.

[15] The Court rejected that proposition as being too speculative. Noting that all subdivision in the zone required discretionary activity consent, the Court observed that:

*[25] We have no way of knowing whether existing or future allotment holders will apply for consent to subdivide to the extent of two hectare allotments, nor whether they can replicate the conditions which led the Council to grant consent in the cases referred to by Mr Brown, nor at what point the consent authority will consider that policies requiring avoidance of over-domestication of the landscape have been breached. In general terms we do not consider that reasonable expectations of landowners can go beyond what is permitted by the relevant planning documents or existing consents.*

[16] At the time that the appeal was heard before the Environment Court, there was both an operative and a proposed district plan. The Court’s focus was properly on the proposed district plan, however, because the relevant provisions in it had passed the stage where they might be further modified by the submission and reference process under the Act. Under the proposed district plan (which we will call simply the “district plan”, or “the plan” from this point), it was necessary for the Court to classify the landscape setting of the proposed development. The Court found that the appropriate landscape category was “Other Rural Landscape”. In doing so the Court rejected the arguments that had been put to it by the Council and by parties appearing under s 271A of the Act that the proper classification was “Visual Amenity Landscape”. Both are terms used and described in the district plan.

[17] Once again, the Court’s reasoning was based on what it thought would happen in the future. It held that the “central question in landscape

classification” was whether the landscape “when developed to the extent permitted by existing consents” would retain the essential qualities of a Visual Amenity Landscape. That would not be the case here, because of the extent of existing and likely future development of “lifestyle” or “estate” lots both in the triangle and outside it.

[18] The Environment Court then discussed the effects of the development on the environment. It found that the subdivision works would introduce an unnatural element to the landforms in the triangle, but that they would be largely imperceptible, and the landform was not one of the best examples of its type. In terms of visual effects, the Court concluded that, although the development could be seen from positions beyond the site, it would not intrude into significant views, nor dominate natural elements in the landscape. As to the effects on “rural amenity” the Court held that the position was “finely balanced”, but after it identified and considered relevant district plan objectives and policies dealing with rural amenity, concluded that the development was marginally compatible with them.

[19] The Court also considered the proposal against relevant assessment criteria in the district plan. It found that the proposal would satisfy most of them. This part of the Court’s decision required it to revisit under s 104(1)(d) of the Act matters already dealt with in the inquiry into effects on the environment under s 104(1)(a).

[20] One of the assessment criteria raised as an issue whether the proposed development would be complementary or sympathetic to the character of adjoining or surrounding visual amenity landscape. Another required consideration of whether the proposal would adversely affect the naturalness and rural quality of the landscape through inappropriate landscaping. The Court was able to repeat here conclusions that it had already arrived at earlier in its decision. In particular, it said that although the effects of the proposal on the retention of the rural qualities of the landscape were “on the cusp”:

*. . . in the context of consented development on this and other sites in the vicinity the proposal is just compatible with the level of rural development likely to arise in the area.*

[21] Having considered the objectives and policies of the district plan as a whole, the Court concluded that while the proposal was marginal in respect of some significant policies, it was supported by others. Consequently, it was “not contrary to the policies and objectives taken as a whole”.

[22] In the balance of its decision the Court rejected an argument of the Council that the decision would create an undesirable precedent. It considered the proposal against the higher level considerations flowing

from Part II of the Act, expressed a conclusion that the effects on the environment of allowing the activity would be minor, provided that there was a condition proscribing any further subdivision of the land, and then moved to the exercise of its discretion to grant consent under s 105(1)(c) of the Act. For present purposes it should be noted that the Court's conclusion that there would not be an undesirable precedent set by the grant of consent was expressly justified on the basis that the proposal had been comprehensively designed, and would provide facilities for the public that would link to other facilities in the triangle. The Court considered that it was difficult to imagine that another such comprehensive proposal could be designed for another location, given the "level of subdivision and building that has already occurred within the triangle". Further, the Court's conclusion that adverse effects on the environment would be minor was reached:

*[h]aving considered carefully the changes that will occur on the surrounding environment as a result of consents already granted and the "baseline" set by existing resource consents on the land. . .*

[23] So it can be seen that, in respect of the main issues that the Court had to decide, its reasoning in each case was predicated on the ability to assess the development against the future conditions likely to be present in the area.

### **The High Court decision**

[24] The questions earlier set out particularise the challenged conclusions of Fogarty J. On the first issue, as to whether the receiving environment should be understood as including not only the environment as it exists, but also the reasonably foreseeable environment, Fogarty J essentially adhered to his own reasoning in *Wilson v Selwyn District Council* [2005] NZRMA 76. He held in that case that "environment" in s 104 includes potential use and development in the receiving environment.

[25] Accordingly, the Environment Court had not erred when it took into account the approved building platforms both within and outside of the triangle. In [74] of the judgment Fogarty J said:

*In my view the reason why the baseline analysis is abrupt is that the Court had no doubt at all that advantage would be taken of approved building platforms in this very valuable location. Mr Goldsmith's view was not challenged in cross-examination. Ms Kidson, the landscape witness for the Council, took into account that more houses would be built as a result of a number of consents.*

[26] Fogarty J went on to observe that the Environment Court's approach did not involve speculation, and that the Court had rejected an argument that it should take into account the possibility of further subdivision as a result of possible future applications for discretionary activity consent. He observed that in that respect, the approach of the Environment Court was more cautious than that which he himself had taken in *Wilson v Selwyn District Council*.

[27] One of the questions that has been raised on the appeal concerns the adequacy of the Environment Court's consideration of the application of what has come to be known as the "permitted baseline". Although that expression was used by Fogarty J in [74], we doubt that he was using the term in the sense that it is normally used, that is with reference to developments that might lawfully occur on the site subject to the resource consent application itself. Rather, Fogarty J appears to have used the expression to refer to the likely developments that would take place beyond the boundary of the subject site, utilising existing resource consents. Nothing turns on the label that the Judge used to refer to lawfully authorised environmental change beyond the subject site. However, it would be prudent to avoid the confusion that might result from using the term other than in its normal sense, addressed in *Bayley v Manukau City Council*, *Smith Chilcott Ltd v Auckland City Council* and *Arrigato Investments Ltd v Auckland Regional Council*. As we will emphasise later in this judgment the "permitted baseline" is simply an analytical tool that excludes from consideration certain effects of developments on the site that is subject to a resource consent application. It is not to be applied for the purpose of ascertaining the future state of the environment beyond the site.

[28] The second and third questions raised on the appeal have their genesis in particular provisions in the Council's proposed district plan. Under the landscape classification employed by that plan, the Environment Court held that the receiving environment of the subject application should be regarded as an "Other Rural Landscape". In a passage which again uses the expression "baseline" in an unusual context, Fogarty J said at [76]:

*Mr Wylie argued that, although there was evidence before the Court on which it could conclude the landscape was Other Rural Landscape that it reached that decision after taking into account, irrelevantly, that the landscape would be developed to the extent permitted by existing consents. So he was arguing that the much earlier finding of Other Rural Landscape was affected by this same area of baseline analysis. As I do not think that there is any error of baseline analysis, this point cannot be sustained. It is, however, appropriate to comment on one detail in Mr Wylie's argument in case it be thought I have overlooked it.*

[29] The Judge accepted Mr Wylie's argument that the Environment Court had considered their judgment regarding the effect of the proposal on rural amenity as finely balanced. Having observed that the Environment Court was an expert Court, was thoroughly familiar with the Queenstown area and skilled in the assessment of landscape values, Fogarty J said at [79]:

*In my view Mr Wylie's argument has to depend on the point he has reserved, namely that a consent authority applying s 104 in these circumstances must consider the receiving environment as it exists, and ignore any potential development: whether it be imminent pursuant to existing building consents; or allowed as permitted uses; or potentially allowable as discretionary activity, controlled activity, or non-complying activity. If that is the law, then the judgment by the Environment Court on other rural landscape may be infected with an error of law, in a material way.*

[30] The Judge had already decided that there was no such error of law, because it was proper for the Environment Court to consider the future state of the environment.

[31] Fogarty J also held that the Environment Court had not erred in assessing the proposed development by reference to the lot sizes permitted in the rural-residential zone. Essentially, he held that this was a legitimate course to follow, because the site was located in an Other Rural Landscape, which is the least sensitive of the landscape categories provided for in the district plan. Using terms that appear in the district plan itself, Fogarty J said at [87]:

*Obviously different levels of protection of landscape value will depend on whether the proposed developments impact on romantic landscape, Arcadian landscape or other landscape. Reading the [plan] as a whole one would expect quite significant protection of romantic and Arcadian landscape. The degree of protection of other landscape, including Other Rural Landscape from any further development is less certain.*

[32] He noted there were no minimum subdivisional allotment sizes for the rural general zone. It was a zone that contemplated consents being granted for a wide range of activities provided they did not compromise the landscape and other rural amenities. The proposal had been designed to have a park-like appearance and would incorporate planting that would to some extent screen the development from neighbouring land use. He concluded at [90]:

*Had the Court been proceeding on the basis of a classification of the landscape as Arcadian, considering Rural Residential*

5           Standards could well have been taking into account an irrelevant consideration. But where the Court considers that the Arcadian character of the landscape has gone and is dealing with a rural landscape already showing some kind of residential character, I do not think it can be said that an expert Court has fallen into error of law by looking at the standards in the rural living area zones, when exercising a judgment as to how to address a proposal which is a discretionary activity in the rural general zone of the [plan].

10 [33] Mr Wylie contends that in respect of all these determinations Fogarty J's decision was incorrect in law. We discuss the reasons that he advanced for that contention in the context of the questions that we have to answer.

### **Question 1(a) — The environment**

15 [34] Mr Wylie's principal submission was that Fogarty J erred in holding that the word "environment" includes not only the environment as it exists, but also the reasonably foreseeable environment after allowing for potential use and development. The Council contended that such an approach is not required by the definition of the word "environment" in s 2 of the Act, and that to read the word in that way would be inconsistent with Part II of the Act, in particular with s 7(f).

25 [35] Mr Wylie further submitted that a purposive approach to the relevant statutory provision would lead to a conclusion that the "environment" must be confined to the environment as it exists. He submitted that the reference to "maintenance and enhancement of the quality of the environment" in s 7(f) of the Act was strongly suggestive that it is the environment as it exists at the date of the exercise of the relevant function or power under the Act which must be relevant. He contended that it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to have particular regard to the maintenance and enhancement of the quality of a speculative future environment.

30 [36] Further, referring to the importance of district plans made under the Act and the process of submission in which members of the public may formally participate in the plan preparation process, Mr Wylie argued that when a plan becomes operative, it represents a community consensus as to how development should proceed in the Council's district. Such plans, he submitted, focus on existing environments and put in place a framework for future development. But they do not, as he put it, "assume future putative environments degraded by potential use or development".

40 [37] In addition, Mr Wylie pointed to practical difficulties that he said would make the approach that found favour with the Environment Court and Fogarty J unworkable. There was, in addition, the potential for

“environmental creep” if applicants having secured one resource consent were then able to treat the effects of implementing that consent as something which would alter the future state of the environment whilst returning to the Council on successive occasions to seek further consents “starting with the most benign, but heading towards the most damaging”.

[38] Mr Wylie also argued that to uphold Fogarty J’s view on the meaning of the word “environment” would be to run counter to authorities which have established rules for priority between applicants, authorities dealing with issues of precedent and cumulative effect as well as the authorities already mentioned on the “permitted baseline”.

[39] Both parties have argued the matter as if the word “environment” in s 2 of the Act ought to be seen as neutral on the issue of whether it requires the future, and future conditions to be taken into account. We think that that is true only in the superficial sense that none of the words used specifically refers to the future.

[40] The definition reads as follows:

*“Environment” includes —*

- (a) *Ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities; and*
- (b) *All natural and physical resources; and*
- (c) *Amenity values; and*
- (d) *The social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect the matters stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this definition or which are affected by those matters:*

[41] This provision must be construed on the basis prescribed by s 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999; the meaning of the provision is to be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose.

[42] Although there is no express reference in the definition to the future, in a sense that is not surprising. Most of the words used would, in their ordinary usage, connote the future. It would be strange, for example, to construe “ecosystems” in a way which focused on the state of an ecosystem at any one point in time. Apart from any other consideration, it would be difficult to attempt such a definition. In the natural course of events ecosystems and their constituent parts are in a constant state of change. Equally, it is unlikely that the legislature intended that the enquiry should be limited to a fixed point in time when considering “the economic conditions which affect people and communities”, a matter referred to in paragraph (d) of the definition. The nature of the concepts involved would make that approach artificial.

[43] These views are reinforced by consideration of the various provisions in the Act in which the word “environment” is used, or in which there is reference to the elements that are set out in the four paragraphs of its definition. The starting point should be s 5, which states and explains the fundamental purpose of the Act in the following terms:

5. **Purpose** —

(1) *The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources.*

(2) *In this Act, “sustainable management” means managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while —*

(a) *Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and*

(b) *Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and*

(c) *Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment.*

[44] “Natural and physical resources” are, of course, part of the environment as defined in s 2. The purpose of the Act is to promote their sustainable management. The idea of management plainly connotes action that is on-going, and will continue into the future. Further, such management is to be sustainable, that is to say, natural and physical resources are to be managed in the way explained in s 5(2). Again, it seems plain that provision by communities for their social, economic and cultural well-being, and for their health and safety, is an idea that embraces an on-going state of affairs.

[45] Section 5(2)(a) then makes an express reference to the “reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations”. What to this point has been implicit, becomes explicit in the use of this language. There is a plain direction to consider the needs of future generations. Paragraph (b)’s reference to safeguarding the lifesupporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems also points not only to the present, but also the future. The idea of safeguarding capacity necessarily involves consideration of what might happen at a later time.

[46] The same approach is requisite under paragraph (c). “Avoiding” naturally connotes an on-going process, as do “remedying” and “mitigating”. The latter two words, in addition, imply alteration to an existing state of affairs, something that can only occur in the future.

5 [47] Each of the components of s 5(2) is, therefore, directed both to the present and the future state of affairs. An analysis of the concepts contained in ss 6 and 7 leads inevitably to the same conclusion. That is partly because the particular directions in each section are all said to exist for the purpose of achieving the purpose of the Act. But in part also, the future is embraced  
10 by the words “protection”, “maintenance” and “enhancement” that appear frequently in each section. We do not agree with Mr Wylie’s argument based on s 7(f). “Maintenance” and “enhancement” are words that inevitably extend beyond the date upon which a particular application for resource consent is being considered.

15 [48] The requirements of ss 5, 6 and 7 must be complied with by all who exercise functions and powers under the Act. Regional authorities must do so, when carrying out their functions in relation to regional policy statements (s 61) and the purposes of the preparation, implementation and administration of regional plans is to assist regional councils to carry out  
20 their functions “in order to achieve the purpose of this Act”. Further, the functions of regional councils are all conferred for the purpose of giving effect to the Act (s 30(1)). Consistently with this, s 66 obliges regional councils to prepare and change regional plans in accordance with Part II.

[49] The same obligations must be met by territorial authorities, in  
25 relation to district plans. The purpose of the preparation, implementation and administration of district plans is, again, to assist territorial authorities to carry out their functions in order to achieve the purpose of the Act. Similarly, the functions of territorial authorities are conferred only for the purpose of giving effect to the Act (s 31) and district plans are to be prepared and changed in accordance with the provisions of Part II. There is then a direct linkage of the powers and duties of regional and territorial  
30 authorities to the provisions of Part II with the necessary consequence that those bodies are in fact planning for the future. The same forward looking stance is required of central government and its delegates when exercising  
35 powers in relation to national policy statements (s 45) and New Zealand coastal policy statements (s 56). The drafting shows a consistent pattern.

[50] In the case of an application for resource consent, Part II of the Act is, again, central to the process. This follows directly from the statement of purpose in s 5 and the way in which the drafting of each of ss 6 to 8 requires  
40 their observance by all functionaries in the exercise of powers under the Act. Self-evidently, that includes the power to decide an application for resource consent under s 105 of the Act. Moreover, s 104 which sets out the

matters to be considered in the case of resource consent applications, began, at the time relevant to this appeal:

5                   (1)       *Subject to Part II, when considering an application for a resource consent and any submissions received, the consent authority shall have regard to . . .*

[51]       The pervasiveness of Part II is once again apparent. In the case of resource consent applications, reference must also be made to the list of relevant considerations spelled out in paragraphs (a) to (i) of s 104(1). These include: “any actual and potential effects on the environment of  
10       allowing the activity” (paragraph (a)), the objectives, policies, rules and other provisions of the various planning instruments made under the Act (paragraphs (c) to (f)) and “any other matters that a consent authority considers relevant and reasonably necessary to determine the application” (paragraph (i)).

15       [52]       Each of these provisions is likely to require a consent authority, in appropriate cases, to have regard to the future environment. Insofar as ss 104(1)(c) to (f) are concerned, that will be necessary where the instruments considered require that approach. If the precedent effects of granting an application are to be considered as envisaged by *Dye v Auckland Regional  
20       Council* [2002] 1 NZLR 337 then the future will need to be considered, whether under s 104(1)(d) or s 104(1)(i). As to s 104(1)(a), its reference to potential effects is sufficiently broad to include effects that may or may not occur depending on the occurrence of some future event. It must certainly embrace future events.

25       [53]       Future potential effects cannot be considered unless there is a genuine attempt, at the same time, to envisage the environment in which such future effects, or effects arising over time, will be operating. The environment inevitably changes, and in many cases future effects will not be effects on the environment as it exists on the day that the Council or the  
30       Environment Court on appeal makes its decision on the resource consent application.

[54]       That must be the case when district plans permit activities to establish without resource consents, where resource consents are granted and put into effect and where existing uses continue as authorised by the  
35       Act. It is not just the erection of buildings that alters the environment: other activities by human beings, the effects of agriculture and pastoral land uses, and natural forces all have roles as agents of environmental change. It would be surprising if the Act, and in particular s 104(1)(a) were to be construed as requiring such ongoing change to be left out of account.  
40       Indeed, we think such an approach would militate against achievement of the Act’s purpose.

[55] A further consideration based in particular on the provisions concerning applications leads to the same conclusion. When an application for resource consent is granted, the Act envisages that a period of time may elapse within which the resource consent may be implemented. At the time relevant to this appeal, the statutory period was two years or such shorter or longer period as might be provided for in the resource consent (s 125). Consequently, the effects of a resource consent might not be operative for an appreciable period after the consent had been granted. Mr Wylie's argument would prevent the consent authority considering the environment in which those effects would be felt for the first time. Rather, the consent authority would have to consider the effects on an environment which, at the time the effects are actually occurring, may well be different to the environment at the time that the application for consent was considered. That would not be sensible.

[56] Similarly, it is relevant that many resource consents are granted for an unlimited time. That is certainly the case for most land use and subdivision consents (see s 123(b)). Yet it could not be assumed that the effects of implementing the consent would be the same one year after it had been granted, as they would be in twenty years' time.

[57] In summary, all of the provisions of the Act to which we have referred lead to the conclusion that when considering the actual and potential effects on the environment of allowing an activity, it is permissible, and will often be desirable or even necessary, for the consent authority to consider the future state of the environment, on which such effects will occur.

[58] We have not been persuaded to a different view by any of Mr Wylie's arguments based on practical considerations and conflict with other lines of authority. It was his submission that the practical difficulties arising from Fogarty J's judgment would be significant. He contended that to require those administering district plans, and applicants for resource consents, to take account of the potential or notional future environment would be unduly burdensome, and would require them to speculate about what might or might not occur in any particular receiving environment, about what future economic conditions might be, and, possibly about how such future economic conditions might affect future people and communities. He submitted that this would require a degree of prescience on the part of consent authorities that was inappropriate.

[59] In support of those propositions he referred to *O'Connell v Christchurch City Council* [2003] NZRMA 216, and in particular to what was said by Panckhurst J at [73]:

*I also agree with the submission of Mr Chapman for AMI/AMP that an extension of the rule to include potential activities on sites*

*other than the application site would place an intolerable burden on the consent authority when assessing resource consent applications.*

5 [60] The concerns expressed by Mr Wylie about practical difficulties were overstated. It will not be every case where it is necessary to consider the future environment, or where doing so will be at all complicated. Suppose, for example, an application for resource consent to establish a new activity in a built up area of a city. There will be rules which provide for permitted activities and in the vast majority of cases it would be likely that 10 the foreseeable future development of surrounding sites would be similar to that which existed at the time the application was being considered. In such a case, it might be a safe assumption that the environment would, in its principal attributes, be very much like it presently is, but perhaps more intensively developed if there are district plan objectives and policies 15 designed to secure that end. At the other end of the spectrum, if one supposed an application to carry out some new activity involving development in an area which was rural in nature and which was intended to remain so in accordance with the policy framework established by the district plan, then once again it ought not be difficult to postulate the future 20 state of that environment.

[61] Difficulties might be encountered in areas that were undergoing significant change, or where such change was planned to occur. However, even those areas would have an applicable policy framework in the district plan that, together with the rules, would give considerable guidance as to 25 the nature and intensity of future activities likely to be established on surrounding land. In cases such as the present, where there are a significant number of outstanding resource consents yet to be implemented, and uncontested evidence of pressure for development, the task of predicting the likely future state of the environment is not difficult.

30 [62] The observations made by Panckhurst J in *O'Connell v Christchurch City Council* must be read in context. He was dealing with an appeal from an Environment Court decision overturning a decision by the City Council to grant consent to establish a tyre retail outlet. AMI and AMP occupied multi-storey office premises adjoining the subject site and had 35 appealed to the Environment Court against the Council's decision. When the Environment Court set aside the Council's decision, the applicant for resource consent appealed to the High Court. One of the issues raised on the appeal was a contention that the Environment Court had misapplied the "permitted baseline test" in as much as it had considered the effects of 40 permitted activities on only the subject site and had not considered the effects of permitted activities on adjacent sites as well. At [70] Panckhurst J said:

[70] I accept that the Court did apply the baseline test with reference only to the subject site. That is it compared the proposed activity against other hypothetical activities that could be established on this site as of right in terms of the transitional and proposed plans. Regard was not had to the impact of the establishment of hypothetical activities on a closely adjacent site. Was such an approach in error?

[71] I am not persuaded that it was. This conclusion I think follows from a reading of various decisions where the permitted baseline assessment has been considered in a number of contexts.

[63] The Judge referred to *Bayley v Manukau City Council*, *Smith Chilcott Ltd v Auckland City Council* and *Arrigato Investments Ltd v Auckland Regional Council*, and concluded that the required comparison for purposes of permitted baseline analysis is one that is restricted to the site in question. There was nothing in those cases which was consistent with the extension of the test for which the appellant had contended. We have earlier expressed our view that the “permitted baseline” has in the previous decisions of this Court been limited to a comparison of the effects of the activity which is the subject of the application for resource consent with the effects of other activities that might be permitted on the subject land, whether by way of right as a permitted activity under the district plan, or whether pursuant to the grant of a resource consent. In the latter case, it is only the effects of activities which have been the subject of resource consents already granted that may be considered, and the consent authority must decide whether or not to do so: *Arrigato Investments Ltd v Auckland Regional Council*, at [30] and [34]-[35].

[64] We agree with Panckhurst J’s observations about the limits of the “permitted baseline” concept, and we also agree with him that the decisions of this Court have not suggested that it can be applied other than in relation to the site that is the subject of the resource consent application. However, it is a far step from there to contend that *Bayley v Manukau City* and the decisions that followed it, dictate the answer on the principal issues to be determined in this appeal. The question whether the “environment” could embrace the future state of the environment was not directly addressed in those cases, nor was an argument in those terms apparently put to Panckhurst J.

[65] It is as well to remember what the “permitted baseline” concept is designed to achieve. In essence, its purpose is to isolate, and make irrelevant, effects of activities on the environment that are permitted by a district plan, or have already been consented to. Such effects cannot then be taken into account when assessing the effects of a particular resource consent application. As Tipping J said in *Arrigato* at [29]:

5            *Thus, if the activity permitted by the plan will create some adverse effect on the environment, that adverse effect does not count in the ss 104 and 105 assessments. It is part of the permitted baseline in the sense that it is deemed to be already affecting the environment or, if you like, it is not a relevant adverse effect. The consequence is that only other or further adverse effects emanating from the proposal under consideration are brought to account.*

10 [66]        Where it applies, therefore, the permitted baseline analysis removes certain effects from consideration under s 104(1)(a) of the Act. That idea is very different, conceptually, from the issue of whether the receiving environment (beyond the subject site) to be considered under s 104(1)(a), can include the future environment. The previous decisions of this Court do not decide or even comment on that issue.

15 [67]        We do not overlook what was said in *Bayley v Manukau City Council* at p 577, where the Court referred to what Salmon J had said in *Aley v North Shore City Council* [1998] NZRMA 361 at 377:

20            *On this basis a consideration of the effect on the environment of the activity for which consent is sought requires an assessment to be made of the effects of the proposal on the environment as it exists.*

The Court said that it would add to that sentence the words:

*. . .or as it would exist if the land were used in a manner permitted as of right by the plan.*

25 [68]        However, it must be remembered first, that *Bayley* was the case in which the permitted baseline concept was formally recognised, and as we have explained did not deal with the issue which has to be decided in this case. Secondly, it was a case about notification of resource consent applications. The issue that arose concerned the proper application of s 94 of the Act, and the provisions it contained allowing non-notification in cases  
30 where the adverse effect on the environment of the activity for which consent was sought would be minor. In that context there could be no need to consider the future environment, because if the effects on the existing environment were not able to be described as minor, there would be no need to look any further.

35 [69]        Mr Wylie referred to other practical difficulties which he illustrated by reference to Fogarty J's decision in *Wilson v Selwyn District Council*. In that case, as in this, Fogarty J held that the term "environment" could include the future environment where the word is used in s 104(1)(a) of the Act. He held further that, to ascertain the future state of the environment it was appropriate to ask, amongst other things, whether it was  
40 "not fanciful" that surrounding land should be developed, and to have

regard in that connection to what was permitted in a proposed district plan. Because the district plan contemplated the subdivision of neighbouring land as a controlled activity, His Honour held that it was plain that the District Council did not regard it as fanciful that the land in the locality might be subdivided down into smaller sites with increased dwellings. Mr Wylie pointed out that although subdivision was a controlled activity under the proposed plan relevant in that case, and there were no submissions challenging that, there were, however, submissions challenging the right to erect dwellings, as Fogarty J himself had recorded in [38] of the judgment. Mr Wylie criticised the decision on the basis that it had effectively “pre-empted” the submission process in relation to the district plan. It would also, in his submission, lead to considerable uncertainty.

[70] Mr Wylie further argued that in the present case, some of the remarks made by Fogarty J suggested that the possibility of development pursuant to resource consents for discretionary or even non-complying activities should be taken into account to ascertain the future state of the environment, in advance of such consents being granted.

[71] That is an inference which can arise from what the Judge said at [79]:

*In my view Mr Wylie’s argument has to depend on the point he has reserved, namely that a consent authority applying s 104 in these circumstances must consider the receiving environment as it exists, and ignore any potential development: whether it be imminent pursuant to existing building consents; or allowed as permitted uses; or potentially allowable as discretionary activity, controlled activity, or non-complying activity. If that is the law, then the judgment by the Environment Court on Other Rural Landscape may be infected with an error of law, in a material way.*

[72] Fogarty J noted that the decision of the Environment Court in the present case had rejected an argument that it should take into account the likelihood of future successful applications for discretionary activity consent. At [74] he said:

*As noted, the Court did go on to reject taking into account the further subdivision and thus even more houses resulting from successful applications for discretionary activities. It may be noted that that is a more cautious approach than I took in Wilson and Rickerby, see [62] and [81].*

[73] The reference here to *Wilson and Rickerby* was a reference to the case now reported as *Wilson v Selwyn District Council*.

[74] These observations by the Judge express too broadly the ambit of a consent authority’s ability to consider future events. There is no justification

for borrowing the “fanciful” criterion from the permitted baseline cases and applying it in this different context. The word “fanciful” first appeared in *Smith Chilcott Ltd v Auckland City Council* at [26], where it was used to rule out of consideration, for the purposes of the permitted baseline test, activities that the plan would permit on a subject site because although permitted it would be “fanciful” to suppose that they might in fact take place. In that context, when the “fanciful” criterion is applied, it will be in the setting of known or ascertainable information about the development site (its area, topography, orientation and so on). Such an approach would be a much less certain guide when consideration is being given to whether or not future resource consent applications might be made, and if so granted, in a particular area. It would be too speculative to consider whether or not such consents might be granted and to then proceed to make decisions about the future environment as if those resource consents had already been implemented.

[75] It was not necessary to cast the net so widely in the present case. The Environment Court took into account the fact that there were numerous resource consents that had been granted in and near the triangle. It accepted Mr Goldsmith’s evidence that those consents were likely to be implemented. There was ample justification for the Court to conclude that the future environment would be altered by the implementation of those consents and the erection of dwellings in the surrounding area.

[76] Limited in this way, the approach taken to ascertain the future state of the environment is not so uncertain as to be unworkable or unduly speculative, as Mr Wylie contended.

[77] Another concern that was raised by Mr Wylie was the possibility of “environmental creep”. This is the possibility that someone who has obtained one resource consent might seek a further resource consent in respect of the same site, but for a more intensive activity. It would be argued that the deemed adverse effects of the first application should be discounted from those of the second when the latter was considered under s 104(1)(a). Mr Wylie submitted that if s 104(1)(a) requires that consideration be given to potential use and development, there would be nothing to stop developers from making a number of applications for resource consent, starting with the most benign, and heading towards the most damaging. On each successive application, they would be able to argue that the receiving environment had already been notionally degraded by its potential development under the unimplemented consents.

[78] This fear can be given the same answer as was given in *Arrigato* where the Court had to determine whether unimplemented resource consents should be included within the “permitted baseline”. At [35] the Court said:

[35] *Resource consents are capable of being granted on a non-notified as well as a notified basis. Furthermore, they relate to activities of differing kinds. There may be circumstances when it would be appropriate to regard the activity involved in an unimplemented resource consent as being part of the permitted baseline, but equally there may be circumstances in which it would not be appropriate to do so. For example, implementation of an earlier resource consent may on the one hand be an inevitable or necessary precursor of the activity envisaged by the new proposal. On the other hand the unimplemented consent may be inconsistent with the new proposal and thus be superseded by it. We do not think it would be in accordance with the policy and purposes of the Act for this topic to be the subject of a prescriptive rule one way or the other. Flexibility should be preserved so as to allow the consent authority to exercise its judgment as to what bearing the unimplemented resource consent should have on the question of the effects of the instant proposal on the environment.*

[79] The Environment Court dealt with the implications of the existing resource consents in the present case in a manner that was consistent with that approach. It will always be a question of fact as to whether or not an existing resource consent is going to be implemented. If it appeared that a developer was simply seeking successively more intensive resource consents for the same site there would inevitably come a point when a particular proposal was properly to be viewed as replacing previous proposals. That would have the consequence that all of the adverse effects of the later proposal should be taken into account, with no “discount” given for consents previously granted. We are not persuaded that the prospect of “creep” should lead to the conclusion that the consequences of the subsequent implementation of existing resource consents cannot be considered as part of the future environment.

[80] Three other issues, raised by Mr Wylie in support of his argument that “environment” should be confined to what exists at the time the resource consent application is considered by the consent authority, can be briefly mentioned. First, he suggested that the contrary approach would have the effect of negating the result of cases that have decided that priority as between applicants should be established in accordance with the time when applications are made to a consent authority (*Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council* [1997] 3 NZLR 257 and *Geotherm Group Ltd v Waikato Regional Council* [2004] NZRMA 1). That argument would only be legitimate if we were to endorse Fogarty J’s decision that resource consent applications not yet made but which conceivably might be made, could be taken into account. That is not our view.

[81] Secondly, Mr Wylie contended that to hold that the word “environment” included potential use or development would undermine the decision of this Court in *Dye v Auckland Regional Council* where it had been decided that the grant of a resource consent had no precedent effect in the “strict sense”. It is apparent from [32] of that decision, that what was meant by use of the expression “the strict sense” was that one consent authority is not bound by its own decisions or those of any other consent authority. We do not agree that a decision that the “environment” can include the future state of the environment has any implications for what was decided in *Dye*.

[82] Finally, Mr Wylie contended that if unimplemented resource consents are taken into account, then consent applications will fall to be decided on the basis of the environment as potentially affected by other consents. He submitted that this was to all intents and purposes “precedent by another route”. We do not agree. To grant consent to an application for the reason that some other application has been granted consent is one thing. To decide to grant a resource consent application on the basis that resource consents already granted will alter the existing environment when implemented, and that those consents are likely to be implemented is quite a different matter.

[83] There is nothing in the High Court’s decision in *Rodney District Council v Gould* [2006] NZRMA 217 on the question of cumulative effects which has any implications for the current issue. That decision simply explained what was already apparent from what this Court had decided in relation to cumulative effects in *Dye v Auckland Regional Council* that is, that the cumulative effects of a particular application are effects which arise from that application, and not from others.

[84] In summary, we have not found, in any of the difficulties Mr Wylie has referred to, any reason to depart from the conclusion which we have reached by considering the meaning of the words used in s 104(1)(a) in their context. In our view, the word “environment” embraces the future state of the environment as it might be modified by the utilisation of rights to carry out permitted activity under a district plan. It also includes the environment as it might be modified by the implementation of resource consents which have been granted at the time a particular application is considered, where it appears likely that those resource consents will be implemented. We think Fogarty J erred when he suggested that the effects of resource consents that might in future be made should be brought to account in considering the likely future state of the environment. We think the legitimate considerations should be limited to those that we have just expressed. In short, we endorse the Environment Court’s approach. Subject to that reservation, we would answer question 1(a) in the negative.

**Question 1(b) — Speculation**

[85] The foregoing discussion means this and the subsequent questions can be answered more briefly. The issue raised by this question is whether taking into account the approved building platforms in and near the triangle, was speculative. The process adopted by the Environment Court cannot properly be characterised as having involved speculation. The Court accepted Mr Goldsmith’s evidence that it was “practically certain” that the approved building sites in and near the triangle would be built on. Mr Wylie confirmed that there was no issue with the Environment Court’s finding of fact on the likelihood of future houses being erected.

[86] However, Mr Wylie argued that the environment against which the application fell to be assessed comprised only the existing environment. If that assertion were correct, he submitted that it followed that the potential effects of unimplemented resource consents were irrelevant.

[87] We have already rejected his contention that the relevant environment was confined to the existing environment. It follows that there is no basis upon which we could find error of law in relation to Question 1(b).

**Question 1(c) — Consideration of the permitted baseline**

[88] The issue raised by this question is whether the Environment Court had given adequate and appropriate consideration to the application of the permitted baseline. Mr Wylie’s argument on this issue proceeded as if the Environment Court had been making a decision about the permitted baseline when it allowed itself to be influenced by its conclusion that the building sites in and around the triangle would be developed. For reasons that we have already given, we do not consider that the receiving environment was properly to be approached on the basis of a “permitted baseline” analysis, as that term has normally been used.

[89] Whatever label is put upon the exercise, Mr Wylie’s main contention in this part of his argument was that there was nothing in the Environment Court’s decision to show that it had a discretion of the kind that had been explained by this Court in the decision in *Arrigato Investments Ltd v Auckland Regional Council*, in particular the passage at [35] that we have earlier set out. Mr Wylie submitted that properly understood, the decision in *Arrigato* meant that there was a discretion when it came to the consideration of unimplemented resource consents. Mr Wylie also contended that it was not obvious from the Environment Court’s judgment that it was aware that it had that discretion, let alone that it had exercised it.

[90] We do not consider that it is appropriate to describe what is simply an evaluative factual assessment as the exercise of a discretion. Further, we

agree with Mr Castiglione that the Council’s argument wrongly conflates the “permitted baseline” and the essentially factual exercise of ascertaining the likely state of the future environment. We have previously stated our reasons for limiting the permitted baseline to the effects of developments on the site that is the subject of a resource consent application. On the relevant issue of fact, the Environment Court relied on the evidence of Mr Goldsmith about the virtual certainty of development occurring on the approved building platforms in and around the triangle. There was no error in that approach.

5  
10 [91] In reality the present question simply raises, in a different guise, the central complaint that the Council makes about the acceptance by both the Environment Court and the High Court that the receiving environment can include the future environment. That issue is not to be approached by invoking the permitted baseline, so the question posed does not strictly arise. We simply answer the question by saying that the issues raised by the Council in this part of the appeal do not establish any error of law by the Environment Court, nor by Fogarty J.

### **Question 2 — Landscape Category**

20 [92] The Council argued that the Environment Court had wrongly concluded that the landscape category it was required to consider was an “Other Rural Landscape” under the district plan. It was contended that Fogarty J had erred by approving the Environment Court’s approach.

25 [93] The district plan defines and classifies landscapes into three broad categories, “Outstanding Natural Landscapes and Features”, “Visual Amenity Landscapes” and “Other Rural”. The classification of a particular landscape can be important to the consideration of resource consent applications, because different policies, objectives and assessment criteria apply to land within the different categories.

30 [94] Landscapes in the “outstanding” category are described in the district plan as “romantic landscapes — the mountains and the lakes — landscapes to which s 6 of the Act applies”. The important resource management issues are identified as being the protection of these landscapes from inappropriate subdivision, use and development, particularly where activity might threaten the openness and naturalness of the landscape. With respect to “Visual Amenity Landscapes”, the district plan describes them in the following way:

40 *They are landscapes which wear a cloak of human activity much more obviously — pastoral (in the poetic and picturesque sense rather than the functional sense) or Arcadian landscapes with more houses and trees, greener (introduced) grasses and tend to be on the district’s downlands, flats and terraces.*

The district plan seeks to enhance their natural character and enable alternative forms of development where there are direct environmental benefits of doing so. This leaves a residual category of “other rural landscapes”, to which the district plan assigns “lesser landscape values (but not necessarily insignificant ones)”.

[95] There was a contest in the Environment Court as to whether the landscape to be considered in the present case was properly categorised as “Visual Amenity” or “Other Rural”. In making its assessment as to which classification should apply, the Environment Court plainly had regard to what the landscape would be like when resource consents already granted were utilised. At [32], it said:

*We consider that the landscape architects called by the Council and the section 271A parties have been too concerned with the Court’s discussion of the scale of landscapes and have not sufficiently addressed the central question in landscape classification, namely whether the landscape, when developed to the extent permitted by existing consents, will retain the essential qualities of a VAL, which are pastoral or Arcadian characteristics. We noted (in paragraph 3) that development of “lifestyle” or “estate” lots for rural-residential living is not confined to the triangle itself.*

[96] It then made reference to existing developments in the area finding some to be highly visible and detracting significantly from any “arcadian” qualities of the wider setting. It concluded that the landscape category was Other Rural.

[97] We accept, as Mr Wylie submitted, that in large part that conclusion of the Environment Court was apparently based on the view that it had formed about what the landscape would be like when modified by the implementation of as yet unimplemented resource consents.

[98] In the High Court, Fogarty J recorded the submission that had been made to him by Mr Wylie that, although there was evidence before that Court on which it could have concluded that the landscape was “Other Rural”, nevertheless it had reached that conclusion after taking into account, irrelevantly, that the landscape would be developed to the extent permitted by existing consents. Fogarty J held first that this was in effect a repetition of the arguments previously made about faulty baseline analysis. As he did not consider that the Environment Court had made any error in that respect, Mr Wylie’s argument could not be sustained. A little later in the judgment, Fogarty J confirmed his view that a landscape categorisation decision could only be criticised if the Court was obliged to ignore future potential developments in the area ([79] of his decision, set out in [29] above).

[99] Mr Wylie repeated in this context his argument that the Court had been obliged to consider the environment as it existed at the time that it made its decision. That argument must fail for the reasons that we have already given. However, in this Court Mr Wylie developed another argument based not on the relevant statutory provisions, but on provisions of the district plan itself. Mr Wylie's argument was based on Rule 5.4.2.1 of the district plan.

[100] Rule 5.4.2 contains "assessment matters" which are to be considered when the Council decides whether or not to grant consent to, or impose conditions on, resource consent applications made in respect of land in the rural zones. As we have previously noted those assessment criteria vary according to the categorisation of the landscape. Before the actual assessment matters are stated, however, Rule 5.4.2.1 sets out a three-step process to be followed in applying the assessment criteria. It provides as follows:

#### ***5.4.2.1 Landscape Assessment Criteria — Process***

***There are three steps in applying these assessment criteria. First, the analysis of the site and surrounding landscape; secondly determination of the appropriate landscape category; thirdly the application of the assessment matters. For the purpose of these assessment criteria, the term "proposed development" includes any subdivision, identification of building platforms, any building and associated activities such as roading, earthworks, landscaping, planting and boundaries.***

#### ***Step 1 — Analysis of the Site and Surrounding Landscape***

*An analysis of the site and surrounding landscape is necessary for two reasons. Firstly it will provide the necessary information for determining a sites ability to absorb development including the basis for determining the compatibility of the proposed development with both the site and the surrounding landscape. Secondly it is an important step in the determination of a landscape category — i.e. whether the proposed site falls within an outstanding natural, visual amenity or other rural landscape.*

*An analysis of the site must include a description of those existing qualities and characteristics (both negative and positive), such as vegetation, topography, aspect, visibility, natural features, relevant ecological systems and land use.*

*An analysis of the surrounding landscape must include natural science factors (the geological, topographical, ecological and dynamic components in [sic] of the landscape), aesthetic values (including memorability and naturalness), expressiveness and*

legibility (how obviously the landscape demonstrates the formative processes leading to it), transient values (such as the occasional presence of wildlife; or its values at certain times of the day or of the year), value of the landscape to Tangata Whenua and its historical associations.

### **Step 2 — Determination of Landscape Category**

This step is important as it determines which district wide objectives, policies, definitions and assessment matters are given weight in making a decision on a resource consent application.

The Council shall consider the matters referred to in Step 1 above, and any other relevant matter, in the context of the broad description of the three landscape categories in Part 4.2.4. of this Plan, and shall determine what category of landscape applies to the site subject to the application.

In making this determination the Council, shall consider:

- (a) to the extent appropriate under the circumstances, both the land subject to the consent application and the wider landscape within which that land is situated; and
- (b) the landscape maps in Appendix 8.

### **Step 3 — Application of the Assessment Matters**

Once the Council has determined which landscape category the proposed development falls within, each resource consent application will then be considered:

First, with respect to the prescribed assessment criteria set out in Rule 5.4.2.2 of this section;

Secondly, recognising and providing for the reasons for making the activity discretionary (see para 1.5.3(iii) of the plan [p1/3]) and a general assessment of the frequency with which appropriate sites for development will be found in the locality.

[101] Mr Wylie argued, that even if his argument confining “environment” to the current environment failed, nevertheless in accordance with these district plan provisions it could not be relevant to consider the future environment other than at Step 3. He submitted that for the purposes of Step 1 and Step 2, attention should be focused solely on the current state of the environment.

[102] Mr Castiglione argued to the contrary, suggesting that the words used in Step 1, “. . . the basis for determining the compatibility of the proposed development with both the site and the surrounding landscape”

were apt to refer to proposed development generally within the landscape. We reject that submission. In context, the reference to “the proposed development” must be the development which is the subject of a particular application for resource consent.

5 [103] But the wording of Steps 1 and 2 does not exclude a consideration of the environment as it would be after the implementation of existing resource consents. Although the second paragraph in Step 1 refers to “existing qualities and characteristics”, the words used are inclusive, and there is nothing to suggest that they are exhaustive. The same applies in  
10 respect to the last paragraph in Step 1. We do not read the words in either paragraph as ruling out consideration of the future environment. Even if that conclusion were wrong it would be legitimate for the Council to consider the future environment as part of “any other relevant matter”, the words used in the second paragraph within Step 2. Further, the second part of Step  
15 2 authorises a broadly based inquiry when it requires the Council to “consider... the wider landscape” within which a development site is situated. There is no reason to read into these words, or any of the other language in Step 2, a limitation of the consideration to the present state of the landscape.

20 [104] It follows that the future state of the environment can properly be considered at Steps 1 and 2, before the landscape classification decision is made. Neither the Environment Court nor Fogarty J erred and Question 2 should be answered no.

### 25 **Question 3 — Reliance on Minimum Subdivision Standards in the Rural-Residential zone**

[105] In the High Court, the Council had argued that the Environment Court had misconstrued the relevant district plan provisions, and taken into account an irrelevant consideration by referring to the subdivision standards contained in the district plan for the rural-residential zone. The subject site  
30 is zoned rural general.

[106] Mr Wylie pointed to three separate paragraphs in the Environment Court’s decision where there had been references to the rural-residential provisions of the plan. In [74] of its decision the Environment Court had discussed evidence that had been given about the desire of the developer to  
35 create a “park-like” environment. A landscape architect whose evidence had been called by the Council expressed the opinion that although the proposal would not introduce urban densities, it was not rural in nature. The Court referred to the fact that in the rural-residential zone a minimum lot size of 4,000 square metres and an associated building platform was permitted. It  
40 will be remembered that the subject development would comprise allotments varying in size between 0.6 and 1.3 hectares. No doubt with that comparison in mind, the Environment Court expressed the view that the

development would provide more than the level of “ruralness” of rural-residential amenity.

5 [107] The next reference to the rural-residential rules was in [78]. The Environment Court was there dealing with the issue of whether the development would result in the “over-domestication” of the landscape. The Court expressed its view that the proposal could co-exist with policies seeking to retain rural amenity and that while it would add to the level of domestication of the environment, the result would not reach the point of over-domestication. That was so, because the site was in an “other rural  
10 landscape”, and the district plan considered that rural-residential allotments down to 4,000 square metres retained an appropriate amenity for rural living.

15 [108] Finally, Mr Wylie referred to the fact that at [92], where the Environment Court was dealing with a proposition that the proposal would be contrary to the district plan’s overall settlement strategy, the Court made a reference to the reluctance that it had expressed in a previous decision to set minimum allotment sizes in the rural-residential zone. Mr Castiglione suggested that the Environment Court had made a mistake, and that it had meant to refer to the rural general zone in that paragraph, not the rural-residential zone. We do not need to decide whether or not that was the case.  
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[109] Having reviewed the various references to the rural-residential in context, Fogarty J held that the Environment Court had not considered an irrelevant matter or committed any error of law in its references to the rural-residential zones. We cannot see any basis to disturb that conclusion. In this  
25 Court Mr Wylie contended that Fogarty J’s reasoning had been based on the fact that the Environment Court had considered that any “arcadian” character of the landscape had gone. He then repeated the point that that conclusion had turned on the fact that the Court had considered the likely future environment as opposed to confining its consideration to the existing environment. He submitted that the decision was wrong for that reason. We  
30 have already rejected that argument.

[110] We do not consider that there was any error of law in the approach of either the Environment Court or the High Court on this issue. Question 3 should also be answered no.

## 35 **Result**

[111] For the reasons that we have given, each of the questions raised on the appeal is answered in the negative. That answer in respect of Question 1(c) must be read in the context that the Environment Court’s analysis of the relevant environment was not a “permitted baseline” analysis.

[112] The respondent is entitled to costs in this Court of \$6,000 plus disbursements, including the reasonable travel and accommodation expenses of both counsel to be fixed, if necessary by the Registrar.